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ONE 
FACT AND VALUE 
john Dupe' 
THERE IS A VIEW O F  SCIENCE, AS STEREOTYPED IN THE HANDS O F  ITS 
critics as its advocates, that goes as follows: Science deals only in facts. 
Values come in only when decisions are made as to how the facts of sci- 
ence are to be applied. Often it is added that this second stage is no spe- 
cial concern of scientists, though this is an optional addition. My main 
aim in this chapter is to see what sense can be made of the first part of 
this story, that science deals only in facts.' 
The expression "deals in" is intentionally vague. Two ways of deal- 
ing fairly obviously need to be considered. First is the question of the 
nature of the products of science. These are certainly to be facts. But 
there might also be a second question about inputs. In generating a fact, 
say, dinosaurs are extinct, one needs to feed some facts in. (These are di- 
nosaur bones. Our best tests suggest they are 80 million years old. No 
dinosaurs have been observed recently. And so on.) So these inputs had 
better be facts, too. 
There are some obvious immediate worries. One might reasonably 
object to the suggestion that the only products of science are facts with 
the observation that science often produces things. Polio vaccines, mo- 
bile phones, laser-guided missiles, and suchlike are often thought of as 
very much what science is in the business of producing. According to 
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the stereotypic view with which 1 began, it may be replied that science 
produces laws and suchlike, on the basis of which it is possible to create 
polio vaccines, mobile phones, and so on. And thetrouble with this is 
that it seems grossly to misrepresent how science a,@uaIlyS)ork~ A 
group of scient~sts trying to develop a vaccine do not try f i r s t ~ ~ f 9 r m u -  
late general rules of vaccine development and then hand them over to 
technicians who will produce the actual vaccines. No doubt they will 
benefit from the past experience, recorded in texts of various kinds, of 
past vaccine makers. And perhaps, if they are successful, they will them- 
selves add to the body of advice for future vaccine makers. But it seems 
beyond dispute that the primary objective here is an effective vaccine, 
not any bit of fact or theory. 
Let us ignore this concern for the time being, however, and con- 
centrate on the question whether, insofar as science produces what we 
might think of as bits of discourse, these bits of discourse are strictly fac- 
tual, never evaluative. So we need to ask what the criterion is for a bit of 
discourse being merely factual. 
It is not hard to find some paradigm cases. "Electrons have negative 
charge" is pretty clearly factual, whereas "torturing children is a bad 
thing to do" is pretty clearly evaluative (though we might note at the 
outset that the clarity of this judgment strongly invites the suggestion 
that it is also a fact). The  existence of these and many other possible par- 
adigms may tempt one to apply the Justice Potter criterion, "I know one 
when I see one." But it is just as easy to find cases that are much less 
clear. Consider, for instance, "The United States is a violent country." 
On the one hand, we can easily imagine a sociologist devising an objec- 
tive measure of social violence-number of murders per capita, num- 
ber of reported cases of domestic violence, and so on-and announcing 
that the United States ranked higher than most comparabIe countries in 
terms of this measure. But on the other hand, we can imagine someone 
describing this conclusion as a negative judgment on the country. 
Of course, there is a familiar response here. We have the fact and 
then the judgment. The fact is that there are certain statistics about acts 
of vioIence. The value judgment is that these statistics constitute a bad 
thing about the place where they were gathered. In support of this dis- 
tinction, we can point out that it is always possible to accept the fact and 
reject the value judgment. Some people approve of violent countries 
(they reveal the rugged independence of the populace, perhaps), and 
31498-UOl-UNCORRECTED-PR0OF.qxd 10 /19 /0  9:27 AM Page 29 4+ 
FACT AND VALUE 29 
perhaps there are even people who think torturing children is a good 
thing. But this defense is beside the present point. That point was just 
that the statement "The United States is a violent counfry" ca$\ be ob- 
viously assigned to either of the categories, factual or eva]d$tive.'ln ca& 
this is not clear, compare the statement "Sam is a violent little 6w.z In 
any normal parlance, this does not mean just that Sam is disposed to oc- 
casional violent acts-that is, after all, true ofvirtually all little boys-still 
less that his rate of violent act production reaches a certain level on a 
standard scale approved by the American Psychological Association. It is 
a criticism of Sam, and probably of his parents, too. Anyone who doubts 
this should visit their nearest day care center and try out this comment 
on the parents collecting their precious charges there. 
Suppose, as I have imagined with the case of social violence, that 
there is indeed a standard measure of violence for little boys. On this 
scale, a violent child is defined as one who emits more than five acts of 
aggression per hour. Now when I, as an expert child psychologist, an- 
nounce that Sam is a violent child, my remark is entirely factual. Should 
his parents find the remark objectionable, I shall point out that this is no  
more than a factual observation, and it is entirely a subjective opinion, 
and one that I as a scientist shall certainly refrain from entertaining, 
whether it is a bad thing to be a violent child. 
A possible conclusion at this point would be something like this: 
"The United States is a violent country" and "Sam is a violent little boy" 
are both potentially ambiguous. Although both may often be used eval- 
uatively, especially by regular folk, scientists use them only after careful 
definition (operationalization) of their meanings. Thus, when used by 
responsible scientists, these statements will turn out to be merely and 
wholly factual. The  statements under consideration are thus seriously 
ambiguous. 
So perhaps scientists would do better to avoid these normatively 
loaded terms and stick to an explicitly technical language. To say that 
Sam scored 84 on the Smith-Jones physical assertiveness scale is much 
less threatening (even if this practically off the scale, the sort of score 
achieved by only the most appallingly violent children). And it is cer- 
tainly true that psychologists or psychiatrists, to pursue the present ex- 
ample, are often more inclined to invoke technical diagnostic language, 
backed up by detailed technical definitions in standard nosological man- 
uals, than to say, for instance, that someone is mad. 
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There is, however, an overwhelming advantage to ordinary evalua- 
tive language: It provides reasons for action. To say that the Un~ted States 
is a violent country is a reason for politicians to act tareduce violence or 
mitigate its effects (for example, by controlling the a v ~ ~ a b i l i b  of Jan- 
gerous weapons). It is, other things being equal, a reason n i t  to Ti-there.  
And so on. It is of no interest just to be given a number and told this is the 
violence index for a country or a city; we want to know whether it is high 
or low or, indeed, whether it is good or bad. Similarly, though here we 
- 
tread on shakier ground, it might be valuable to know that someone is 
mad. It might be expedient to restrain them, or at least not put them in 
charge of security at the local nuclear power station. 
- 
There is a general point here. Once we move away from the rarified 
environments of cosmology or particle physics, we are interested in sci- 
entific investigations that have consequences for action. And this un- 
doubtedly is why, while often paying lip service to operationalized or 
technical concepts, scientific language often gets expressed in everyday 
evaluative language. 
The situation so far seems to me to be this: Many terms of ordinary 
language are both descriptive and evaluative. The reason for this is obvi- 
ous. Evaluative language expresses our interests, which, unsurprisingly, 
are things we are interested in expressing. When we describe things, it is 
often, perhaps usually, in terms that relate to the relevance of things for 
satisfying our interests. Sometimes we try to lay down rather precise cri- 
teria for applying interest-relative terminology to things. These range 
from the relatively banal-the standards that must be met to count as a 
class 1 potato, for instance-to the much more portentous, the standards 
that an act must meet to count as a murder. In such cases, we might be 
tempted to say that the precision of the criteria converts an evaluative 
term to a descriptive one. It is important to notice, however, that the pre- 
cision is given point by the interest in evaluation. The same is often the 
case for operationalized terms in science. More often in everyday life, 
the terms i r e  a much more indeterminate mix of the evaluative and the 
descriptive: crisp, soggy; fresh, stale, or rotten; vivacious, lethargic, idle, 
stupid, or intelligent; or, recalling Austin's memorable proposal for revi- 
talizing aesthetics, dainty and dumpy. 
This, I think, is the language that we use to talk about the things 
that matter to us, and to understand such language requires that we un- 
derstand both the descriptive criteria and the normative significance of 
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the concepts involved. It seems to follow that there is no possibility of 
drawing a sharp fact-value distinction. Science may reasonably eschew 
some of these familiar terms on the ground that they are vaguc apd im- 
precise and may try to substitute more precisely defined ah&inativ&, BUT 
first, the use of these alternatives will ult~mately depend on their & p h r -  
ing the evaluative force of the vaguer terms they replace. And second, 
science does not, and almost certainly cannot, entirely dispense with the 
hybrid language of description and evaluation. This fact makes the as- 
sumption of a sharp fact-value distinction not only untenable but also 
often harmful. 
So much for the general background of skepticisln about the fact- 
value distinction. For the rest of this chapter, I shall be concerned with 
more detailed specific examples. Two such examples will illustrate more 
concretely how normativity finds its way into scientific work and how its 
denial can potentially be dangerous. 
Before continuing, though, I have one more very general com- 
ment. The  examples that I shall discuss will both be drawn from parts of 
science directly connected to human concerns. I have often heard the 
view expressed that though it is interesting and important that the hu- 
man sciences should be contaminated with values, it is not altogether 
- 
surprising. But what would really concern the advocate of the value- 
neutrality thesis with which this chapter began would be an indication 
that physics or chemistry or mathematics was value laden. So, on such a 
view, I am dodging the really important task. 
In reply, let me first say that I do  not propose to deny that many of 
the results of these sciences may well be value free. The  sense in which 
I am questioning the legitimacy of the fact-value distinction is not one 
that implies that there aTe no areas that human values do not infiltrate. 
It is rather that there are large areas, including the domain of much of 
science, in which the attempt to separate the factual from the normative 
is futile. What 1 want to say about physics is that if most or all of physics 
is value free, it is not because physics is science but because most of 
physics simply doesn't matter to us. Whether electrons have a positive 
or a negative charge and whether there is a black hole in the middle of 
our galaxy are questions of absolutely no immediate importance to us. 
The  only human interests they touch (and these they may indeed touch 
deeply) are cognitive ones, and so the only values that they implicate 
are cognitive values. The  statement that electrons have negative charge 
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is thus value free. in a Guite banal sense: It has no bearing on anything 
we care about. 
I said that these were matters ofno immediate ipportar)ce, and the 
word immediate is crucial. It is often pointed out that physics $so Ells 
us how to build nuclear power stations and hydrogen bofnbs. &re, we 
are, to say the least, in the realm of values. There is no  unique nuclear 
power station that physics tells us how to build, nor could there be a 
general theory that applied to the building ofany possible power station. 
Physics assists us in building particular kinds of power stations, and par- 
ticular kinds of power stations are more or less safe, efficient, ugly, and 
so on. Anyone who supposes there is a value-free theory of nuclear power 
station building, let alone hydrogen bomb construction, is, it seems to 
me, a fool or a liar. The argument that physics is value laden beyond the 
merely cognitive values mentioned in the last paragraph seems most plau- 
sibly to depend on some such claim as that physics really is, contrary to 
appearances or propaganda, the science of bomb building. I make no 
judgment on this issue. My point today is just that the value freedom of 
physics, if such there be, has no tendency to show that science is in gen- 
eral value free. 
1.1 Rape 
My first example is not a pleasant one. It is the evolutionary psychologi- 
cal hypothesis about rape.2 The  basic story goes something like this: In 
the Stone Age, when the central features of human nature are said to 
have evolved, females were attracted to mates who had command of re- 
sources that could be expended on rearing children. Perhaps they were 
also attracted to males with good genes-and perhaps these were simply 
genes for being, in the virtuously circular sense characteristic of sexual 
selection, attractive. Perhaps these ancestral females were smart enough 
to deploy some deception on the resource-rich males and get their 
resources from the "Dads" and their genes from the more attractive 
"cads." At any rate, there would very probably have been maIes with 
neither competitive-looking genes nor resources, and they, like every- 
one else, would be looking for a sexual strategy. Because they have no 
chance of persuading any females to engage in consensual sex with them, 
this strategy can be only rape. As is generally the way with evolutionary 
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psychology, once a form bf  behavior has been proposed as a good idea 
in the Stone Age, it is inferred that a module for producing it must have 
evolved. So men, it appears, have a rape module, activated ?hkn they 
find their ability to attract females by any acceptable msthod falls to % 
low enough level. -, -4 
Evolutionary psychologists presenting such theories generally also 
insist on a quite naive version of the fact-value distinction. Their claimed 
discoveries about rape are merely facts about human behavior, certainly 
not facts with any sort of evaluative consequences. We can at least agree, 
contrary to what evolutionary psychologists sometimes accuse their crlt- 
ics of maintaining, that showing that rape is, in the sense just described, 
natural doesn't mean it is good. Earthquakes and the AIDS virus are, 
discounting some paranoid speculations, natural but not thereby good. 
But such theories certainly do have consequences for what would be a p  
propriate policy responses to the incidence of rape. Even this indis- 
putable fact is enough to refute the occasional claim that such theories 
have no evaluative consequences. They have at least the consequences 
that certain policies would be good or bad. The most obvious such policy 
response to the theory in question would be the elimination of poverty, 
since the hypothesis is that it is poor men who are rapists (because they 
lack the resources to attract women). Though certainly a good idea, this 
goal has unfortunately proved difficult to achieve. O n  some plausible 
Marxist analyses, it is a goal that could not be achieved without the elim- 
ination of capitalism-an equally tricky proposition-because, on these 
analyses, poverty is not an intrinsic property of people but a relation be- 
tween people, and a relation that is fundamental to capitalism. And lt is 
interesting that such an analysis appears relevant to the sociobiological 
stories: It is not the intrinsic worthlessness of the failed caveman that 
doomed him to sterility or sexual violence, but his relative lack of worth 
compared with his more fortunate rivals. 
But all of this is, of course, somewhat beside the point. Those who 
have thought seriously about contemporary sexual violence as opposed 
to the hypothetical reproductive strategies of imagined ancestors have 
observed that rape is not exclusively, or even mainly, a crime of re- 
sourceless reproductive predators lurking in dark alleyways but has much 
more to do with misogyny, and more to do with violence than sex, let 
alone reproduction. Its causes appear, therefore, to be at the level of ide- 
ology rather than economics. 
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These implicatio~s indicate that the stakes are high in theorizing 
about matters of this moment, but they do not get to the heart of my 
present argument. So far, I have spoken as if there is no prg@em what- 
ever in deciding what, in the context of this theoretica~/riqui;k, we5re 
talking about. Indeed, to make research simpler, sociobiolog?isas-often 
begin their investigation of rape with observations of flies or ducks. If we 
have a good understanding of why sexually frustrated mallards leap out 
from behind bushes and have their way with unwilling, happily part- 
nered, passing ducks, then the essential nature of rape is revealed, and 
we can start applying these insights to humans. Of course, what this bla- 
tantly ignores is the fact that human rape (and I doubt whether there is 
any other kind) is about as thoroughly normative a concept as one could 
possibly find. Those who supposed they were investigating the causes of 
rape but, since they were good scientists, were doing so with no precon- 
ceptlons as to whether it was a good or a bad thing, are deeply confused: 
They lack any grasp of what it is that they are purporting to investigate. 
All this is perfectly obvious when one looks at real issues rather than 
pseudoscience. A more serious perspective on rape is that it involves a 
profound violation of the rights of its victims. When, not long ago, it was 
- ~ 
conceptually impossible for a married man to rape his wife, this reflected 
a widespread moral assumption that, vis-2-vis her husband, a woman 
had no rights. Indeed, the husband was supposed to have a right, perhaps 
divinely guaranteed, to whatever kinds of sexual relations he  desired with 
his wife. Nowadays, more complex debates surround the concept of date 
rape, the exact tones of voice in which no means yes, and so on. Less 
controversially, it has long been understood that sexual relations with 
young children is a form of rape, because the relation between adults 
and small children does not permit meaningful consent. But the age at 
which consent becomes possible varies greatly from culture to culture 
and is often subject to renegotiation. 
The  point of this is not to argue that there is no place for science in 
relation to such a topic. O n  the contrary, there are quantitative and 
qualitative sociological questions, psychological questions, criminologi- 
cal questions, and no doubt others that are of obvious importance. The  
point is just that if one supposes one is investigating a natural kind with 
a timeless essence, an essence that may be discovered in ducks and flies 
as much as in humans, one is unlikely to come up with any meaningfuI 
results. Though this is an extreme example, in that the value ladenness 
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in this case is so b~indin~l iobvious  that only the most extreme scientism 
can conceal it, I think it is atypical only in that obviousness. As I argued 
in the opening section of this chapter, fact and value a,re typi$aTly inex- 
tricably linked in the matters that concern us, and we 3 ~ .  most oftekl: 
concerned with matters that concern us. +, -6Y- 
1.2 Economics 
My second example is a quite different one. Nowhere is the tradition of 
dividing the factual from the evaluative more deeply ingrained than in 
economics. In recognition of the fact that issues about the production 
and distribution of the goods on which human life depends do have a 
normative component, there is, indeed, a branch of economics called 
normative, or welfare, economics. But this is sharply divided from the 
properly factual investigations of so-called positive economics, and it is 
hardly a matter of debate that it is the latter that is the more prestigious 
branch of the discipline. In common with traditional positivism and 
contemporary scientism, the underlying assumption of this distinction 
is that there is a set of economic facts and laws that economists are em- 
ployed to discover and that what to do with these is largely a matter for 
politicians or voters to d e ~ i d e . ~  
And in fact, normative economics has itself tended to reinforce this 
perspective and therefore tried to limit itself to the question whether 
there are economic actions that are indisputably beneficial. This con- 
cern is expressed in the focus of attention on the criterion of Pareto o p  
timality: An economic allocation is said to be Pareto optimal if there is 
no possible transfer of goods that would improve the lot of some agent 
or agents while harming no one. It may be that failures to achieve Pareto 
optimality should be addressed where possible (though even this may 
be called into question by some accounts of distributive justice). But the 
"optimality" in "Pareto optimality" is a dubious one. If, for example, I 
possess everything in the world and I derive pleasure from the knowl- 
edge that I own everything in the world, this distribution of goods con- 
stitutes a Pareto optimum. If some crust of my bread were diverted to a 
starving child, I would no longer have the satisfaction of owning every- 
thing in the world, and similarly with any other possibIe transfer. So one 
person, myself, would be less well off. But this would be an unconvincing 
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argument that this distribution was optimal, or even good. There are, of 
course, countless Pareto optima, which by itself suggests something anom- 
alous in the use of the term optimum. . < .  
The  problem is perfectly obvious. Although we can all agree tfiat 
Pareto optimality is a good thing if we can get it, the issuh of i 3 b ~ s t  is 
which of the many Pareto pptima we should prefer. Pareto optimality is 
really about efficiency, whereas we are interested in properly normative 
economics in matters such as justice. We should recall here the general 
assumption that science in general, and economics in particular, should 
aim simply to describe the mechanisms of economic activity and leave 
~t to others to decide what to do with it. Not only is this assumption at 
work in positive economics but also it is even more starkly visible in 
much of the practice of normative economics, which is concerned not 
with how economies ought to be organized but with efficiency. 
I believe that this is a highly undesirable, and very probably inco- 
herent, conception of the business of economists. One way to see that it 
is undesirable is to note that when we consult supposedly expert econo- 
mists about what might be good economic policy, we might naively 
suppose that they would have useful advice to offer us. But on the con- 
ception under review, it turns out that, apart perhaps from pointing to 
the occasional departure from Pareto optimality, they have no relevant 
expertise whatever. They are, after all, experts in efficiency, not policy. 
But because economists often seem willing to offer such advice, it seems 
disingenuous that they should deny that normative questions are part of 
their discipline. And if they do insist on this denial, they will presumably 
be of much less use to us than we had thought, and we could perhaps get 
by with rather fewer of them. 
More worrying, it is quite clear that there is an implicit normative 
agenda to the vast majority of economic thinking. Because economists 
believe they have something to say about economic efficiency, they are 
naturally inclined to think of this as a good thing. And as the clearest 
measure of efficiency is the ability to produce more stuff with the same 
resources, economists are often inclined to think the goal of economic 
activity is to produce as much stuff as possible. Even if this account of 
the etiology of this goal is disputable, it is hard to dispute that many 
economists do assume such a goal, and assuming a goal is a good way of 
avoiding the vital intellectual labor of considering what the goals of eco- 
nomic activity really should be. Returning to the economists who offer 
of living of foreigners, for instance? Do  the as yet unborn have any claim 
on a decent standard of living? Must we consider the well-being of non- 
human animals or the effects of economic activity on the environment? 
Once again, however, the issue I want to emphasize here is the 
inescapably value-laden nature of the terms in which we talk about our- 
selves and our social existence. Consider a central idea in macroeco- 
nomics, the measurement of which has had profound implications on 
economic policies throughout the world, inflation. Like earthquakes or 
AIDS, inflation is generally seen to be a bad thing. But also like earth- 
quakes and AIDS, it is seen as the sort of thing that can be described 
and theorized without regard to its goodness or badness. 
The  problem here is somewhat different from that for rape. The 
normative judgment is fundamental to the meaning of rape and there- 
fore fundamental to negotiations about what should and should not 
count as rape. With inflation, normativity comes in a little later. The  
primary problem, as has long been familiar to economists, though it 
often appears to surprise others, is that there is no unequivocal way of 
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advice on matters of pubfic policy, I note that very frequently they as- 
sume that what they are required to do is advocate those pollcies that 
they believe, rightly or wrongly, will promote the production of,& much 
stuff as possible. ,'- e 7 
In fact, even ~f we agree that something should be maximi2edby 
economic activity, an enormously difficult question is what that some- 
thing should be. Not infrequently, positive economics assumes that the 
real question is about maximizing wealth measured in monetary terms, 
and tragically, many politicians seem willing to accept this facile view. 
An obviously preferable goal would be something like standard of Iiv- 
ing, except that would be little more than a marker for the difficult ques- 
tion of what constitutes standard of living. The  work particularly of 
Amartya Sen4 has made it clear that any satisfactory analys~s of this con- 
cept will be only marginally related elther to any standard account of 
utility or to the accumulation of wealth. It is also clear that even if we 
knew what constituted standard of living, we would still have to face the 
task of deciding how this should be distributed. Surely, the utility of in- 
creases in standard of living declines as one reaches more comfortable 
levels, so greater good can be gained by distributing standards of living 
more equally. And there is also the question of who should be among 
the beneficiaries of a distribution. Should we care about the standards 
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measuring this econokic property. It would be easy enough if every- 
thing changed in price by identical percentages, but of course that does 
not happen. How should we balance a rise in the p ~ j c e  of ~$~le'toods, 
say, against a fall in the price of air travel? The imrnedi,@ly ot&ious'ie- 
ply is that we should weight different items In proportion fb th+ount 
spent on them. The  problem, then, is that not all goods are equally con- 
sumed by all people or even by all groups of people. It is quite com- 
monly the case that luxury goods fall in price while basic necessities 
rise. It might be that these cancel out under the suggested weighting, so 
that there is no  measured inflation. But for those too poor to afford lux- 
ury goods, there has manifestly been an increase in the price level. 
How, then, does one decide how such an index should be con- 
structed? The  unavoidable answer, it seems to me, is that it depends on 
the purposes for which it is to be constructed. There are many very prac- 
tical such purposes. People on pensions, for instance, may have their in- 
comes adjusted to account for changes in the level of inflation. For such 
purposes, the goal might reasonably be to maintain the value of the pen- 
sion, in which case the ideal would be to enable typical pensioners to con- 
tinue to afford the goods that they had previously consumed. Of course, 
no  pensioner is absolutely typical, but a case might be made for addressing 
particularly the case of pensioners dependent solely on the pension. For 
such ends, it would clearly be desirable to have specific indices designed 
for specific groups. But the goals might be quite different, calling for dif- 
ferent measures. For example, and perhaps more plausibly, one such goal 
might be to save the taxpayer money. 
Perhaps the central goal nowadays of inflation measurement is as 
an input into the decision procedures of central banks in determining 
interest rates. In Britain (I'm not sure how widespread the practice is), 
this leads to the rather bizarre habit of regularly announcing something 
called the "underlying rate of inflation." This is a measure of inflation 
that ignores changes in mortgage payments consequent on changes in 
interest rates. The rationale for this appears to be that the article of faith 
on which much macroeconomic policy depends is that the inflation 
rate is inversely related to interest rates. Since increasing interest rates 
has an immediate and large effect in increasing the prices confronted 
by consumers, this central dogma would be constantly refuted if mort- 
gage costs were included in the measure of inflation. Hence the under- 
lying rate is important as a way of allowing the theory to be maintained. 
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(I suppose this aspect of the matter is of more obvious concern to stu- 
dents of the theory laden than of the value laden.) 
- -  ., 
Yet another aspect of all this is that the assumptiosl that isflation is , ,  
objectively bad is by no means simple. In common with,mbst n;'jddler:. 
class Americans, I have spent substantial parts of my life 6 w i n ~ ~ x g e  
sums of money borrowed at fixed interest rates. From a personal point of 
view, therefore, I have always seen inflation as something to be enthusi- 
astically welcomed. The deep horror with which it is now perceived 
should lend support to those who believe that the world is mainly con- 
trolled by bankers. 
Some quite different aspects of value ladenness could be introduced 
by considering another central macroeconomic concept, employment. 
Having work is widely perceived in many contemporary cultures as a nec- 
essary condition for any social status and even for self-respect. But what 
counts as work is a complicated and contentious issue and one that has 
profound implications for all kinds of economic policies. It is still fre- 
quently the case, for instance, that work is equated with the receipt of fi- 
nancial reward, with the consequence that domestic work, from raising 
children to the domestic production of food, was, from an economic per- 
spective, a form of unemployment. A quite different concept can be 
found in Adam Smith (and an earlier Adam who was required to make his 
living "in the sweat of thy face"), in which work is generally unpleasant- 
toil and trouble-and understood by its contrast to leisure or ease (see 
Smith 199433). Quite different again is the idea, most conspicuously de- 
veloped by Karl Mam, that work provides the possibility of human self- 
fulfilIment. Both these conceptions are evidently value laden, and the no- 
tion that there can be a purified economic conception of work, somehow 
divorced from any of these varied normative connotations, seems both 
misguided and potentially danger~us .~  There are, in sum, many ways in 
which values figure in the construction and use of many of our concepts, 
and scientific concepts are no exceptions. For much of language, the no- 
tion of separating the one from the other is altogether infea~ible.~ 
1.3 Conclusion 
As I indicated earlier, I am not claiming that there is no distinction be- 
tween the factual and the normative. What I do claim is that this is not 
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a distinction that can be read off from a mere inspection of the words in a 
sentence or a distinction on one side or the other of which every concept 
can be unequivocally placed. For large tracts of language-Ce~tially, the 
language we use to describe ourselves and our societies+fhe factual 2nd 
the nonnative are thoroughly interconnected. Where matters "dkinpor- 
tance to our lives are at stake, the language we use has more or less pro- 
found consequences, and our evaluation of those consequences is deeply 
embedded in the construction of our concepts. The fundamental distinc- 
tion at work here is that between what matters to us and what doesn't. 
There are plenty of more or less wholly value-free statements, but they 
achieve that status by restricting themselves to things that are of merely 
academic interest to us. This is one reason that physics has been a some- 
times disastrous model for the rest of science. We hardly want to limit sci- 
ence to the investigation of things that don't matter much to us one way 
or the other. The application of assumptions appropriate only to things 
that don't matter to those that do is potentially a disastrous one. 
NOTES 
I. 1 am grateful to Francesco Guala and Harold Kincaid for helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this chapter. This work was completed as part of the program of the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Centre for Genomics in Society (Ege- 
nis). The support of the ESRC is gratefully acknowledged. 
2. A standard reference is Thornhill and Thornhill (1992). The ideas were popular- 
ized by Thornhill and Palmer (2000). For detailed rebuttal, see various essays in Travis 
(2003). 
3. A classic paper by Friedman (1953) provides a well-known statement of this 
position. 
4. A number of insightful discussioni of the issue can be found in Nussbaum and 
Sen (1993). 
5. These different meanings of work are discussed in more detail in Dupre (2001, 
138-46) and Gagnier and Duple (1995). 
6. For more detailed accounts of important aspects of value ladenness in econom- 
ics, see Starmer (2000) and Cuala (zooo). 
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